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344 PARKER V. BOWRON [40 U.2d 
[L. A. No. 22294. In Bank. Mar. 6, 1953.) 
LESTER A. PARKER et al., Appellants, v. FLETCHER 
BOWRON, as Mayor of the City of Los Angeles et al., 
Respondents. 
[1] Parties-Objections and Waiver-Want of Capacity to Sue.-
'Vhere question of capacity to sue has not been raised by de-
murrer or answer, it must be deemed to have been waived 
and cannot be urged on appeal. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 430, 
434.) 
[2] !d.-Objections-Want of Capacity to Sue.-There is a dis-
tinction between incapacity to sue or a mere legal disability, 
such as infancy or insanity, which deprives a party of the 
right to come into court, and the right to relief, which goes 
to the existence of a cause of action. 
[3] Abatement- Distinctions.- An objection questioning plain-
tiff's right to relief or the existence of a cause of action is 
not a plea in abatement. 
[4] Id.-Parties-Disability.-A defense based on lack of capacity 
to sue is a plea in abatement. 
[5] Pleading-Demurrer to Complaint-Insufficiency of Facts to 
Constitute Cause of Action.-Where a complaint states a 
cause of action in someone, but not in plaintiff, a general 
demurrer for failure to state a cause of action will be sus-
tained. 
[6] !d.-Waiver-Failure of Complaint to State Cause of Action. 
-An objection that a complaint does not state a cause of 
action in plaintiff is not waived by failure to raise it by 
demurrer or answer, and may be raised at any point in the 
proceedings. (Code Civ. Proc., § 434.) 
[7] Mandamus-Effectiveness and Necessity.-The granting of a 
writ of mandate is discretionary and it will be granted only 
where necessary to protect a substantial right and only when 
it is shown that some substantial damage will be suffered 
by petitioner if the writ is denied. 
[8] !d.-Parties-Petitioners-Party Beneficially Interested.-A 
writ of mandate will not be issued except upon affidavit on 
[5] See Cal.Jur., Pleading, § 64; Am.Jur., Pleading, § 212. 
[7] See Cal.Jur., Mandamus, § 13; Am.Jur., Mandamus, § 37. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Parties, §51; [2] Parties, § 41; 
[3) Abatement, §1; [4] Abatement, §23; [5) Pleading, §91; 
[6] Pleading, § 278; [7) Mandamus, § 11(2); [8, 15] Mandamus, 
§ 82; [9, 10, 14] Mandamus, § 82 (2) ; [11-13, 16] Parties, § 10. 
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11pplication of the party beneficially interested. (Code Civ. 
Proc., § 1086.) 
[9] !d.-Parties-Petitioners-Special Interest.-A writ of man-
date will not issue where plaintiff fails to show that it will 
subserve or protect some right or interest of his, or where 
it is apparent that he has no direct interest in the action 
sought to be coerced, and that no benefit can accrue to him. 
[10] !d.-Parties-Petitioners-Special Interest.-Petitioner, as 
an individual, fails to show a proper interest to maintain a 
mandamus proceeding to compel city officials to fix a salary 
or wage for city employees in certain classifications at least 
equal to prevailing scale for similar employment in private 
industry, where he does not plead that he is an employee 
of the city, nor even that he is a resident or taxpayer thereof, 
and where there is no indication that any benefit could ac-
crue to him if the writ were issued, nor that he will suffer 
any detriment if it is denied. 
[11] Parties-Suing on Behalf of All.-Code Civ. Proc., § 382, 
authorizing representative or class suits, is basc1d on the doc-
trine of virtual representation and is an exception to the 
general rule of compulsory joinder of all interested parties; 
it is a codification of the common law theory of convenience 
to the parties when one or more fairly represent the rights 
of others similarly situated who could be designated in the 
controversy. 
[12] Id.-Suing on Behalf of All.-To authorize a class proceed-
ing there must be a well-defined community of interest in 
the questions of law and fact involved as affecting the par-
ties to be represented. 
[13] Id.-Suing on Behalf of AIL-Petitioner is not authorized 
to bring a representative action on behalf of city employees 
to compel eity officials to fix a salary or wage for such em-
ployees at least equal to prevailing scale for similar employ-
ment in private industry, where he does not claim to be 11 
member of the interested class, there is nothing to indicate 
that he is "similarly situated" with those whom he pretendR 
to represent, and there can be no "common or general in-
terest" in the subject between him, who is not employed by 
city, and city employees. 
[14] Mandamus-Parties-Petitioners-Special Interest.--A labor 
council and its affiliated unions have no ;,;tanding to maintain 
a mandamus proceeding to compel city officials to fix a salary 
or wage for certain city employees at least <'qual to prevail-
ing wage for similar employment in private industry, where 
no facts are alleged which show any right or interest of 
[11] See Cal.Jur., Parties, § 7; Am.Jur., Parties, § 44 et seq. 
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the unions in the action sought to be commanded, there is 
no indication that any benefit except possibly the incidental 
one of satisfying a very small proportion of their members, 
could accrue to them if the writ were issued, and they could 
not suffer any detriment if it is denied. 
[15] !d.-Parties-Petitioners-Party Beneficially Interested.-A 
labor council is not authorized as a "party beneficially inter-
ested" within the meaning of Code Civ. Proc., § 1086, to 
maintain a mandamus proceeding to compel city officials to 
fix a salary or wage for certain city employees at least equal 
to prevailing wage for similar employment in private in-
dustry, where there is no statutory duty of supervision or 
representation placed on such council's affiliated unions, where 
they are not public boards but private organizations created 
to foster diverse personal interests of their members, where 
they have no legal standing as purported representatives of 
city employees in negotiations with the city, and where the 
city has no duty to bargain collectively or contract with the 
UnlOnS. 
[16] Parties-Suing on Behalf of AIL-A labor council is not a 
proper party to bring a representative suit to compel city 
officials to fix a salary or wage for certain city employees 
at least equal to prevailing wage for similar employment in 
private industry, where neither such council nor its affiliated 
unions are members of the class of city employees sought 
to be represented, where only a small number of members 
of the affiliated unions are city employees, and where there 
is no allegation that any of them is employed by depart-
ments for which the wage and salary scale is established 
by the city eouncil. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Walter R. Evans, Judge.* Affirmed. 
Proceeding in mandamus to compel city officials to fix a 
salary or wage for all of city's employees in certain classifica-
tions at least equal to prevailing scale for similar employ-
ment in private industry. Judgment denying writ affirmed. 
David Sokol and Clarence E. Todd for Appellants. 
Hay L. Che:,;ebro, City Attorney (Los Angele:,;), Bourke 
,Jones, Assistant City Attorney, George William Adams, Alan 
G. Campbell and ,John F. F'elflmeier, Deputy City Attorneys, 
for Respondents. 
•·Assigned by Chairman of Judicial Council. 
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~JDMONDS, .J.- 'rhr pm·pose of this mandate proceeding 
is to r-ompel tlw respondent eit.v officials to fix a salary or 
11·ag·e for· all of tlw eity '~; emplor(oes iu certain elasRifications 
at least eqnal to the prevailing stale for similar employment in 
private inclnstry. The appeal from the judgment of dismissal 
primarily presents for decision the question as to whether 
the proceeding is brought by a person or persons having 
the requisite beneficial interest. 
According to the caption of the petition, the relief is 
sought by "Lester A. Parker, individually and as a mem-
ber of, and Seeretary Treasurer of, the Council of Federated 
Municipal Crafts of IJos Angeles, California, a voluntary un-
incorporated association, and for and on behalf of the follow-
ing members of said association, all of which are unincor-
porated labor organizations: United Brotherhood of Car-
penters & Joiners of America, r~ocal Union No. 2231; United 
Association of Plumbers and Steam Fitters, Local Union No. 
78, Southern California District Council of Laborers; and 
Carpenters District Council of r~os Angeles County, Peti-
tioners.'' 
'rhe petition is signed by Parker as ''Petitioner'' and by 
the "Attorney for Petitioners." lt is alleged that the " [p] eti-
tioner, Council of Federated Municipal Crafts" is an unin-
eorporated association, Parker is its secretary treasurer, cer-
tain designated unions which are unincorporated associations 
are members of the council, and ''the petitioner brings this 
action for and on behalf of himself individually and as Secre-
tary Treasurer'' of the council ''and for and on behalf of'' 
its affiliated unions ''and the members thereof.'' 
The council, it is alleged, is "devoted to the improvement 
of the working conditions of the members of its affiliated 
unions, and to the stabilization of labor relations between the 
City of and County of Los Angeles, and the employees of 
said politieal subdivisions, and has as one of its aims and 
objectives the establishment and maintenance of reasonable 
standards for wages, hours, and working conditions of said 
employees, and the maintenance of industrial peace.'' Ac-
cording to the pleading·, the labor council represents those 
members of the affiliated unions who are working for the city 
and the county. It is stated that of 2,631 members of the 
United Association of Plumbers and Steam Fitters, 26 are 
employed by the city; of approximately 35,000 members of 
the Carpenters DiRtrict Conncil the city employs over 250; 
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aud rnon~ than 1J 0 of ahout 11,000 nwmhers of: thP District 
('ouncil of Lahorrn: are munieipal employee:-;. 
"Yonr prtit.imwr:;: an' the r\·al parties in interest herein," 
it is said, ''sinel' they n~present a substantial part of the 
employees of the City of Los Angeles; that petitioner, the 
Council of Federated Municipal Crafts ... is the collective 
bargaining representative of practically every craft of em-
ployee of the City ... as well as'' 28 listed unions. Aecord-
i 11g to the petition, "the sole purpose of the activities of the 
petitioner, Council of Federated Municipal Crafts ... is to 
foster, promote, and develop the welfare of ·wage earners em-
ployed by the City ... to improve their working conditions 
and to advance their opportunities for profitable employment.'' 
Section 425 of the city charter provides: ''In fixing the com-
pensation to be paid to persons in the City's employ, the 
Council and every other authority authorized to fix salaries 
or wages, shall, in every instance, provide a salary or wage 
at least equal to the prevailing salary or wage for the same 
quality of service rendered to private persons, firms or cor-
porations, under similar employment, in case such prevailing 
salary or wage can be ascertained.'' 
According to the petition, ''the respondents in fixing the 
compensation paid to the members of the 'affiliated Unions'", 
made a survey of salaries and wages paid by private industry 
in the Los Angeles area. 'fhis survey, it is alleged, dis-
closed that the rates of pay in private industry were higher 
than those paid by the city, "in violation of Section 425." 
The "respondents," it is said, "had available data from which 
it eoulcl ascertain the prevailing salary or wage paid to per-
Rons under similar employment for the same quality of services 
rendered to private persons, firms or corporations, but re-
spondents failed, neglected and refused to pay such prevailing 
salary or wages and refused to consider, or to take into con-
sideration, such prevailing salary or wages in fixing the 
salaries or wages of the earpenters, laborers and plumbers." 
Tt is alleged that "demand was made on respondents that in 
fixing the compensation to be paid to the members of the 
'affiliated Unions' respondents provide for a salary or wage 
at least equal to the prevailing salary or wage for the same 
quality of service rendered to private persons, firms or cor-
porations under similar employment; that at all times since 
... respondents have failed and refused to do so.'' 
''Petitioners have no plain, speedy or adequate remedy 
at law," the plea(ling· eontimlE's, "to eompel the respondents 
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... to perform the public duty which they have under Sec-
tion 425 of the City Charter ... and there is no method ex-
cept by means of this petition whereby the petitioners can 
question the ... acts of respondents and secure complete 
acljmlication of their rights and adequate and complete re-
lief." The "petitioners pray" that a writ of mandate issue 
commanding the respondents to provide a salary or wage ''for 
all of its employees classified as laborers, carpenters and 
plumbers" at least equal to the scale prevailing in private 
industry. 
By ansvver, the respowlents "rleny that th<~ petitioner brings 
this aetion for or on behalf of himself either indivirlually or 
as Seeretary-1'reasurer of the Council ... and deny that the 
petitioucr brings this action for or on behalf of the affiliated 
nnions ... or on behalf of any members thereof or for or on 
behalf of an:~;one whomsoever." It is also denied that the 
eonneil "repre:,;ents or can represent any members of the said 
affiliated nnions as to their wages, honrs and working con-
ditions, or as to the Rrttlement of grievances in connection 
with the rmploymrnt of any of them by" the city, connty, or 
various eity ag·encies. The respondents also deny that the 
council ''represents anyone collectively or otherwise either 
in bargaining for wages, hours or working conditions or other-
wise in resped to T1is employment by any of the said govern-
mental entities.'' 
Other allegations of the answer arc that a survey was made 
of salaries and wages paid in private industry. 'l'he in-
formation so obtained, it is said, together with other informa-
tion. was considered by the members of the city council in 
reaching the decision that the salaries and wages paid to city 
0mployees are at l0ast equal to those prevailing in private 
industry. According to the pleading, "none of the petitioners 
is a rral party in interest hrrein, or is employed by the City 
of Tjo,; Angeles, or l1as any claim herrin, nor is any of the 
prtitioners the eollectivr bargaining representative of any 
eruplo)·ee of" the eity or its ageneies. 
By supplement to the answer, it is alleged that, since the 
eommeneement of the proeeeding, the city couneil has amended 
the salary standardization ordinance. As now in effect, the 
ordinanee fixes inereased rates of eompensation. 
TTpon the eommeneement of the trial, the respondrnts ob-
.ieeted to the introduetion of any evidenee upon the gronnds 
"that the petitioner, Lester A. Parker, is neither a real party 
in interest nor a party beneficially interested" and that the 
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petition failed to state a cause of action. The court sustained 
the objection upon both grounds. Judgment was entered 
discharging the alternative writ, denying the petition and 
ordering that "the petitioners" take nothing. The notice of 
appeal recites that the "petitioners," designated in the same 
manner as in the caption of the petition, appeal from the 
judgment. 
In the briefs upon appeal, the use of the plural designation 
''petitioners'' is, for the most part, abandoned, reference 
being made to the "petitioner and appellant" in most in-
stances. However, sometimes the labor council is referred 
to specifically as the petitioner and at other times the refer-
ence to "petitioner" appears to mean Parker. It is contended 
that the "petitioner," apparently irrespective of whether 
Parker, or the council, or the affiliated unions be so designated, 
has the requisite beneficial interest and representative stand-
ing to maintain the proceeding and that the petition states 
a cause of action. It is also argued that the trial court erred 
in denying the "petitioner" the right to inspect the city's 
survey records and to take the deposition of one Howard 
E. Earl. 
The respondents contend that neither the unions nor Parker, 
whichever be deemed the "petitioner," is a proper party to 
bring the proceeding and the petition fails to state a cause of 
action. According to them, the only reasonable interpretation 
of the petition is that Parker is the sole petitioner. They 
also argue that the orders claimed to be erroneous are not 
reviewable upon this appeal. 
It is impossible, either from the caption or the body of the 
petition, to determine with certainty who is intended to be 
the "petitioner" or "petitioners." Apparently, it was Park-
er's belief that, as an individual, he could bring a representa-
tive suit upon behalf of all city employees and, as an officer 
of the labor eouncil, sue on its behalf. There is some indication 
that the ·named affiliated unions were not intended to bf' 
petitioners, but were considered as represented by the council's 
action. 
The respondents argue that the council cannot be deemed 
to be a petitioner because it is simply an affiliation of various 
unions. No individual city employee can be a member of 
the council. Also, the respondents say, neither the council 
nor the affiliated unions can be a petitioner be1!ause each 
is an unincorporated association incapable of suing in its own 
name. The former contention raises the question of the 
Mar.1953] PARKER V. BOWRON 
[40 1 C.2d 344; 254 P.2d 6] 
351 
eouncil 's ;;:tanding to maintain this procerding; the lattrr 
•·hallrngeR tht\ <·apaeity of thr unions to sue. 
[1] Insofar as thP question of capacity to R\!e is con-
cerned, not having· been raised by demurrer or answer, it 
must be deemed to have been waived and cannot now be urged 
upon appeal. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 430, 434; Illopstock v. 
Superior Court, 17 Cal.2d 13, 17 [108 P.2d 906, 135 A.L.R. 
318].) [2] However, the question of standing to sue is 
different from that of capacity. Incapacity is merely a Legal 
disability, such as infancy or insanity, which deprives a party 
of the right to come into court. The right to relief, on the 
other hand, goes to the existence of a cause of action. [3, 4] It 
is not a plea in abatement, as is lack of capacity to sue. 
[5] Where the complaint states a cause of action in someone, 
but not in the plaintiff, a general demurrer for failure to state 
a cause of action will be sustained. (Klopstock v. St~perior 
Cmtrt, supra, pp. 18-19.) [6] This objection is not waived 
by failure to raise it by demurrer or answer, and may be 
raised at any point in the proceedings. (Code Civ. Proc., 
§ 434.) Here, by the objection to the introduction of any 
evidence, it has been properly raised as to whomever may 
be considered the ''petitioner'' or ''petitioners.'' 
[7] ''The granting of a writ of mandate is discretionary 
and it will be granted only where necessary to protect a 
substantial right and only when it is shown that some sub-
stantial damage will be suffered by the petitioner if said writ 
is denied." (Ault v. Council of City of San Rafael, 17 Cal. 
2d 415, 417 [110 P.2d 379] ; May v. Board of Directors, 34 
Cal.2d 125, 134 [208 P.2d 661] ; Gay v. Torrance, 145 Cal. 
144, 147 [78 P. 540].) [8] "The writ of mandate will not be 
issued except upon affidavit on the application of the party 
beneficially interested. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1086.)" (Fritts 
v. Chm·les, 145 Cal. 512, 513 [78 P. 1057].) [9] "The writ 
of mandate will not issue in a case where the plaintiff fails 
to show that it will subserve or protect some right or interest 
of his .... The writ will not lie 'where it is apparent that 
the relator has no direct interest in the action sought to be 
coerced, and that no benefit can accrue to him from its per-
formance.' " (Ellis v. Workman, 144 Cal. 113, 115 [77 P. 
822] .) 
[10] Parker, as an individual, alleg-es no facts to show 
that he has any right or interest in the action sought to be 
commanded. He does not plead that he is an employee of 
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the city, nor (~ven that he is a resident or taxpayer of the 
city. Thern is no indication that any benefit could accrue 
to him if the writ were is;;;neil, nor that he will Ruffer any 
detriment if it is denied. 
'l'he situation is clearly distinguishable from that in Hollman 
v. Warren, 32 Cal.2d 351 [196 P.2d 562], where the petitioner 
was both an applicant for appointment as a notary and a 
resident and taxpayer of the city and county. Under those 
circumstances, the majority of the court held that the peti-
tioner had shown a proper interest to contest the validity of 
the statute under which the governor refused to consider 
her application. There, the petitioner had a direct interest 
in securing consideration of her application in addition to 
her interest as a citizen in having a sufficent number of 
notaries commissioned to serve the needs of the public. In 
the present case, however, Parker cmmot benefit directly by 
an increase in the pay scale of city employees. Neither has 
he alleged that he is a citizen interested in having the duty 
in question enforced. 
Parker urges, however, that he has brought this proceeding 
as a representative suit on behalf of city employees who 
have a direct interest in the enforcement of the duty. He 
relies upon the provision of section 382 of the Code of Civil 
Procedure that, "when the question is one of a common or 
general interest, of many persons, or when the parties are 
numerous, and it is impracticable to bring them all before 
the court, one or more may sue or defend for the benefit of 
all.'' 
[11] The statutory provision is based upon the doctrine 
of virtual representation and is an exception to the general 
rule of compulsory joinder of all interested parties. (Weaver 
v. Pasaclen([ Tournament of Roses Assn., 32 Cal.2d 833, 837 
[198 P.2d 514] .) It is a codification of "the common law 
theory of convenience to the parties when one or more fairly 
represent the rights of others similarly situated who could be 
designated in the controversy." (Fallon v. Superior Court, 
33 Cal.App.2d 48, 50 [90 P.2d 858].) [12] "[R]egardless 
of which of the alternative conditions of the statute is invoked 
as authorizing a class proceeding, it has been uniformly held 
that there must be a well-defined 'community of interest' in 
the questions of law and fact involved as affecting the parties 
to be represented." (Weaver v. Pasadena Tournament of 
Roses Assn., sttpra; J ellen v. O'Brien, 89 Cal.App. 505, 509 
[264P.1115].) 
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[13] No faets have bee11 allege(! to bring Parker within 
this 'noll established rule rPgarding- elass snits. He does not 
claim to be a Im~mber of the interested class, and there is 
nothing to indicate that he is "similarly situated" with those 
whom he pretends to represeitt. '!'here ean be no ''common 
or general interest" in 'the subject matter of the controversy 
(Weaver v. Pasadena Tournament of Roses, supra, p. 842) 
between Parker, who is not employed by the city, and city 
employees. Parker cannot give himself standing to sue by 
purporting to represent a class of which he is not a member. 
The cases upon which Parker relies for authorization of 
a representative action by an individual strengthen this con-
clusion. In each of them, the individual seeking to main-
tain the action on behalf of himself and others was a mem-
ber of the class sought to be represented and raised questions 
of law and fact common to himself and other members of 
his class. (Wheelock v. First Presbyterian Ohun;h, 119 Cal. 
477, 481 [51 P. 84lj, individual members of a church suing 
on behalf of all members to recover a fund of money; Weber· 
v. Marine Cooks' & Stewa1·cls' Assn., 93 Cal.App.2d 327 [208 
P.2d 1009], action by group of members of union on behalf 
of all members who chose to join with them for declaration 
of status of constitution and by-laws of the union; Ellis v. 
American Federation of Labor, 48 Cal.App.2d 440 [120 P.2d 
79], members of three unions suing in a representative capac-
ity to enjoin the revocation without a hearing of the charter 
of the Central Labor Council with which their unions were 
affiliated; Law v. 01·ist, 41 Cal.App.2d 862 [107 P.2d 953], 
members of a group teaching theosophy seeking to enjoin 
the use by a competing corporation of the name of their 
society; Peterson v. Donelley, 33 Cal.App.2d 133, 136-137 
[91 P.2d 123], action for an accounting and the removal of 
trustees by one beneficiary of a trust upon behalf of some 
3,000 beneficiaries with common interests; West Virginia State 
Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 629 [63 S.Ct. 
1178, 87 L.Ed 1622, 147 A.hR. 674], members of a religious 
sect suing "for themselves and other similarly situated" to 
restrain enforcement of laws and regulations against their 
sect.) 
Two of the decisions cited by Parker are not in point. In 
Allen v. Hotel & Restaurant etc. Alliance, 97 Cal.App.2d 343, 
348 [217 P.2d 699], the court refused to consider the pro-
ceeding as a representative suit for the reason that the pre-
liminary injunction appealed from applied only to the named 
40 C.2d-12 
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plaintiffs and not to the members of the class whom they 
purported to represent. Dismissal of a class suit by members 
of a religious sect seeking to restrain threatened criminal 
prosecution was affirmed in Douglas v. Jeannette, ill9 U.S. 
157, 165 [63 S.Ot. 877, 882, 87 L.Ed. 1324], upon the ground, 
among others, that there was no showing of an identity of 
issues between the numerous members of the class. 
[14] Insofar as the council and its affiliated unions are 
concerned, whether one or all of them be assumed to be the 
petitioner or the petitioners, the same reasoning applies and 
compels the conclusion that none of them has standing to 
maintain this proceeding. No facts are alleged which show 
any right or interest of the unions in the action sought to 
be commanded. There is no indication that any benefit, ex-
cept possibly the incidental one of satisfying a very small 
proportion of their members, could accrue to them if the writ 
were issued. Nor could they suffer any detriment if it is 
denied. At best, they can claim to act only on behalf of 
their members, since they cannot legally be affected by en-
forcement of the city's duty. None of the unions can have 
the requisite beneficial interest in enforcing a duty owed by 
the city to its employees. (Funeral Directors Assn. v. Board 
of Funeral Directors & Embalmers, 67 Oal.App.2d 311, 313 
[154 P.2d 39] ; cf. Associated Boat Industries v. Marshall, 104 
Oal.App.2d 21, 23 [230 P.2d 379] .) 
[15] The council argues that it is a "party beneficially 
interested'' within the meaning of section 1086 under the 
rule laid down in Board of Soc. Welfare v. County of Los 
Angeles, 27 Cal.2d 98 [162 P.2d 627]. That case, however, 
must be limited strictly to the facts upon which it was based. 
By statute, the Board of Social Welfare was "designated as 
the single State agency with full power to supervise every 
phase of the administration of the public assistance plans for 
which grants-in-aid are received.from the United States Gov-
ernment in order to secure full compliance with the provi-
sions of Title 1 and 4 of the Federal Social Security Act.'' 
(W elf. & Inst., Code, § 103.5.) In upholding its right to 
sue, the court said: ''Generally, when a power or duty is 
imposed by law upon a public board or officer, and in order 
to execute such power or perform such duty, it becomes neces-
sary to obtain a writ of mandamus, it or he may apply for 
the same." (P. 101.) Because of its statutory duty, it was 
held to be ''a proper party to maintain mandamus proceed-
ings against county officials who fail or refuse to issue a war-
Mar.1953] PARKER v. BowRoN 
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rant to a needy aged person who is a member of a class en-
titled thereto.'' 
Here, however, there is no statutory duty of supervision 
or representation placed upon the unions. They are not 
public boards but private organizations created to foster the 
diverse personal interests of their members. As purported 
representatives of city employees in negotiations with the 
city, they have no legal standing. The city has no duty to 
bargain collectively or contract with the unions. (Nutter v. 
City of Santa Monica, 74 Cal.App.2d 292, 303 [168 P.2d 
7 41].) In fact, it may not do so to the extent that the con-
ditions of employment usually arranged by contract are cov-
ered by the provisions of the city charter. (City of Los An-
geles v. Los Angeles etc. Council, 94 Cal.App.2d 36, 46-47 
1210 P .2d 305].) For these reasons, the unions cannot bring 
themselves within the rule of the Board of Social Welfare case. 
Helying upon Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. 
Vail, 103 Colo. 364, 368-369 [86 P.2d 267], the labor council 
argues that a union has sufficient interest in the enforce-
ment of prevailing wage legislation to maintain this pro-
ceeding. In that case, a Colorado statute provided that con-
tractors constructing public works must pay the prevailing 
rate of wages to their employees. Prevailing rates were to 
be stated in the invitation for bids, and disputes were to 
be adjusted by the Industrial Commission. The union, which 
was the collective bargaining agent with contractors for em-
ployees in the construction industry, sought an injunction 
to restrain the state highway engineer from opening certain 
construction bids. It claimed that the rate in the invitation 
to submit bids was not the prevailing wage rate and that 
the dispute should be submitted to the Industrial Commission. 
At the time suit was commenced, there were neither con-
tractors nor employees for the particular projects involved. 
'rhe court construed the statutory purpose to be the avoidance 
of the delays and losses which would result from wage con-
troversies arising during the construction of public works. 
It concluded that, under the peculiar circumstances existing, 
the only practical solution to achieve the legislative intent 
was to hold that the union had a sufficient intereflt m the 
subject matter to maintain the proceeding. 
The situation here is in no way similar to that in the 
Denver Trades Council ease. "The labor council cannot be 
the collective bargaining agent for municipal employees. In 
the present case, there are employees with a present interest 
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in the subject matter of the action. The city charter is 
vastly different from the Colorado statute in its objective. 
There is no purpose to be served by a holding that the union 
may maintain the action, since a sufficient interest reposes 
in others to seek compliance with the intent of the charter. 
In the absence of any similarity between the facts pleaded 
by Parker and the peculiar circumstances of the Denver 
Trades Council case, it is not persuasive in determining the 
present controversy. 
Likewise distinguishable for the same reasons is El Paso 
lJlclg. cf: Constr. rPrades Cmr,neil v. 1'exas Highway Corn., (Tex. 
Civ.App.) 231 S.W.2d 533, 536-538, which arose upon facts 
substantially similar to those of the Denver Trades Council 
case and followed that decision. It is also noteworthy that 
the Texas Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the 
Court of Civil Appeals in the El Paso case upon the ground 
that the action of the highway commission was not subject 
to review and refused to discuss the question of the union's 
standing to sue. (Texas Highway Corn. v. El Paso Bldg. & 
Constr. Trades Cou.ncn, 149 Tex. 457, 468 [234 S.W.2d 857].) 
[16] Equally without merit is the council's contention 
that it is a proper party to bring a representative suit. 
Neither it, nor its affiliated unions, are members of the class 
sought to be represented. Indeed, only a very small num-
ber of the members of the affiliated unions are city employees, 
and there is no allegation that any of them is employed by 
a department for which the wage and salary scale is estab-
lished by the city council. For all that appears, it well may 
be that none of the members of the affiliated unions is a 
member of the class which is supposedly being represented. 
The decisions from other jurisdictions upon which the labor 
council relies as stating the proposition that a union may 
maintain a representative action upon behalf of its mem-
bers are not in point. United Mine Workers v. Coronado 
Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344, 392 [ 42 S.Ct. 570, 66 LEd. 975], 
determined that a labor union, an unincorporated associa-
tion, could be sued in accordance with the provisions of a 
federal statute. No question was raised as to the propriety 
of the association's bringing an action in a representative ca-
pacity. In Hague v. Committee for Inditstrial Organizations, 
307 U.S. 496, 514 [59 S.Ct. 954, 83 I1.Ed. 1423], the court 
held that only the individual plaintiffs, and not the labor 
organizations, could maintain a suit for protection of their 
civil rights. 
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Stapleton v. M1:tchell, 60 F'.Supp. 51, involved an action 
brought by labor uniom; and inctividuals, acting in both in-
dividual and represr,ntative capacities, to test the validity 
of a Kansas labor statute which purported to regulate the 
activities of both the organizations and the individuals. The 
unions and the individuals all had a direct interest in the 
enforcement of the statute. rrhere was no question presented 
concerning the right of a union to sue on behalf of some 
of its members in a matter in which it had no immediate 
interest. Again, in Brotherhood of S. Engineers v. City of 
St. Louis, (Mo.App.) 212 S.W.2d 454, 458, the union had 
a direct interest in challenging an ordinance which allegedly 
deprived it of its statutory right. Thus it was permitted 
to join with individual plaintiffs a number of its officers 
and members, although its interest was not identical to that 
of its members. There is no indication in the opinion that 
it purported to act in a representative capacity. 
Regardless of who may be considered the petitioner or peti-
tioners in this case, it is obvious that none of the parties 
named in the petition can have any standing to maintain 
this proceeding. It is, therefore, unnecessary to consider 
other points presented. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., and 
Spence, J., concurred. 
CAR'l'ER, J.-I dissent. 
The majority opinion is predicated on two propositions: 
( 1) That in order to obtain relief by mandamus the petitioner 
must show substantial damage, and it is discretionary with 
the court whether it shall issue, and (2) petitioner has stated 
no facts from which it would appear that he would benefit by 
the relief sought. The remainder of the opinion consists of 
setting up a row of straw men and knocking them down and 
omitting an important factor. 
Neither of the premises is correct. For the first proposi-
tion the majority relies upon Ault v. Council of City of San 
Rafael, 17 Cal.2d 415 [110 P.2d 379], and some old cases and 
erroneously cites May v. Board of Directors, 34 Cal.2d 125 
[208 P.2d 661]. The May case did not hold that the remedy 
of mandamus was discretionary. It held to the contrary. We 
there said (p. 133): "It has been stated generally in many 
decisions that whether or not a writ of mandate issues, lies 
358 PARKER v. BowRoN [40 0.2d 
within the difwretion of the court .... Yet it must be re~ 
n1embere<l that ''rhc \Hit must be issued in all cases where 
there is not a plain, SJWf'rly, and adequate remedy, in the 
ordinary course of law ... ' (Code Oiv. Proc., § 1086), [em-
phasis added], and where ' ... the petitioner has shown that 
the respondents have refused to perform a clear legal dtdy not 
involving the exercise of any discretion. Under such circum-
stances, the writ should issue.' (Betty v. Superior Court, 18 
Oal.2d 619, 622 [116 P.2d 947] .) Or, as otherwise phrased, 
' ... where one has a substantial right to protect or enforce, 
and this may be accomplished by such a writ, and there is no 
other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary 
course of law, he is entitled as a matter of right to the writ, 
or in other words, it would be an abuse of discretion to refuse 
it.' " (Emphasis added.) On the other hand (necessity of 
substantial damage), the rule was adopted quoting from 
American Jurisprudence, " '[B]y the preponderance of 
authority ... where the question is one of public right and 
the object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement 
of a public duty, the relator need not show that he has any 
legal or special interest in the result, since it is sufficient that 
he is interested as a citizen in having the laws executed and 
the duty in question enforced .... Generally, when a power 
or duty is imposed by law upon a public board or officer, and 
in order to execute such power or perform such duty, it 
becomes necessary to obtain a writ of mandamus, it or he may 
apply for the same.' " (Emphasis added.) (Hollman v. War-
r·en, 32 Oal.2d 351, 357 [196 P.2d 562] .) The identical state-
ment is made in Board of Soc. Welfare v. County of Los 
Angeles, 27 Oal.2d 98 [162 P.2d 627]. It should be noted 
that JYir. Justice Edmonds, the author of the majority opinion 
here, dissented in the Hollman case and is here stating the 
same views he expressed in his dissent there. 
Attempt is made to distinguish the Board of Social Welfare 
case but it cannot be done. There the state welfare board 
was held to be sufficiently interested to seek mandamus to com-
pel the county to pay aid to needy aged persons although the 
state board had no authority to require the county to act. 
The basis of permitting it to bring mandamus proceedings 
in addition to that above mentioned was because ''Persons who 
are members of such a class are ordinarily financially, and 
often physically, unable to maintain such proceedings on their 
own behalf, and to deny to them the assistance of the welfare 
board nuder such circumstances would tend to defeat the pur-
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pose of the legislation which seeks to provide for them during 
needy old age." (Board of Soc. Welfare v. County of Los 
A.ngeles, supra, 27 Cal.2d 98, 100.) Here petitioner had the 
specific duty of protecting the welfare of the members of the 
union, including the employees of the city. It is idle to speak 
of the lack of power to have collective bargaining behveen the 
l'ity and the unions, as does the majority, because that is not 
here involved. The members of the unions, through petitioner, 
are properly aml legitimately seeking redress in the courts. 
There can be no doubt of the beneficial interest of peti-
tioner·. According to the petition for the writ, plaintiff Parker, 
is the secretary and a member of the Council of Federated 
Municipal Crafts of I~os Angeles, an unincorporated labor 
nnion. SeYeral other named unions are affiliated with and 
mem bcrs of that union and the action is brought on behalf of 
all the unions and their members. The unions' purposes are 
the improvement of working conditions and wages of their 
members and represents such members as work for the city of 
Los Angeles. It is the duty of the city council to fix the salaries 
and >vages of plumbers, carpenters and laborers and in doing 
so it mnst eomply with section 425* of the city charter. In 
March, 1950, in fixing the wages for such employees the 
council made a survey in conjunction with the eounty, eity 
sehools, eounty aml city housing authority, of wages paid to 
persons under similar employment for the same quality of 
serviee rendered private persons, firms and corporations, 
which included rlata obtained from employers in the Los 
Angeles area representing the major types of industry and 
business. The survey showed and it is a faet that the pre-
vailing rate of pay in private employment for the above 
mentioned work classifications is higher than the rates fixed by 
the conncil. Tlms the couneil in fixing the salaries and wages 
"had available data from which it could ascertain the pre-
vailing salary or wage paid to persons under similar em-
ployment for the same quality of services rendered to private 
persons, firms or eorporations, but [the eonncil] failed, 
negleeted and refusi'd to pay such prevailing salary or wages 
and refused to consider·, or to take 1:nto cons1:cleration, such 
*''In fixing the compensation to be paid to persons in the City's 
employ, the Council and every other authority authorized to fix sal~ 
aries or wages, shall, in every instance, provide a salary or wage at 
least equal to the preYailing salary or wage fm the same quality of 
serYice rendered to priYate persons, firms or corporations, under sim~ 
ilar employment, in case such prevailing salary or wage can be ascer~ 
tained. '' 
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prwvail,ing salary or wages in fixing the salaries or wages of 
the carpente1·s, laborers and plumbers as aforesaid." 
In a mandamus proceeding, on the return to the alterna-
tive writ or on the day on which the application for the writ 
is noticed, the party upon whom the writ or notice is served 
may answer the petition under oath in the same manner as an 
answer to a complaint in a civil action. (Code Civ. Proc., 
§ 1089.) ''On the trial, the applicant is not precluded by the 
answer from any valid objection to its sufficiency, and may 
connte1·vail it by proof either in direct denial or by way of 
avoidance." (Emphasis added.) (Code Civ. Proc., § 1091.) 
Here plaintiff made every effort when the case was called for 
trial to prove facts in support of his petition and to counter-
vail the answers but was prevented from so doing by reason 
of the sustaining of defendants' objection to the introduc-
tion of any evidence; he did not rest the case on the pleadings. 
Defendants seem to think that a plaintiff in a mandamus 
proceeding must file an answer or reply to the answer or 
return of the defendant. That is not the law. It has been 
stated frequently that in mandamus proceedings the return 
or answer of the defendant is accepted as true, unless con-
troverted by petitioner. (See Htmt v. Mayor &; Cmmcil of 
Riverside, 31 Cal.2d 619 [191 P.2d 426] ; Ertman v. Municipal 
ConTi, 68 Cal.App.2d 143 [155 P.2d 908, 156 P.2d 940] ; 
Vanderbttsh v. Board of Public Works, 62 Cal.App. 771 [217 
P. 785]; McClatchy v. ~Matthews, 135 Cal. 274 [67 P. 134]; 
Lo'velancl v. City of Oakland, 69 Cal.App.2d 399 [159 P.2d 
70] ; Pox v. W orkrnan, 6 Cal.App. 633 [92 P. 742] ; Brown 
v. 8nperior Cou1·t, 10 Cal.App.2d 365 [52 P.2d 256] ; Charles 
L. Donohoe Co. v. 8uperim· Court, 79 Cal.App. 41 [248 P. 
1007]; Friedland v. 8ttpen'or Cmtrt., 67 Cal.App.2d 619 [155 
P .2d 90 ]. ) And a petitioner may file an answer or reply to 
(lpfendant's answer or return. (Scott v. Superior Court, 205 
Cal. 525 [271 P. 906] .) That does not mean, however, that 
a reply to defendant's answer must be filed. That plaintiff 
may controvert the answer by proof-by evidence- is the plain 
meaning of section J 091 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 
supra. 'rhc foregoing authorities were dealing with situations 
where the <lcterminatiou of the matter was sn bmittecl by the 
parties on the pleading:,; alone o1· one of the parties made a 
!llotion for judgment ou the plt>adings. The question of 
wh(other or not defendant's answer conld be eontroverted by 
proof without filing a reply or answer to the answer was not 
presented in any of the cases above cited and it clearly appears 
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from most of them that by reason of section 10!11, supra, 
plaintiff eollld mee1 tbe allegations in the answer by either 
pleading or proof. (ll1 cGlatr:hy v. Matthews, supra, 1 ::!5 Cal. 
274; Vander-bush v. Board of Public 1Vor-ks, supr-a, 62 Cal. 
App. 771; Loveland v. City of Oakland, supra, 69 Cal.App. 
2d 399; Pox v. W orkrnan, supr-a, 6 Cal.App. 633; Charles L. 
Donohoe Co. v. Superior- Court, supra, 79 Cal.App. 41; Fried-
land v. 8nperim· Court, supra, 67 Cal.App.2d 619.) 
Since plaintiff was entitled to countervail defendants' 
answer by proof, though they filed no reply thereto, the denial 
of a right to put in any evidence, was prejudicial error. 
Hence, if the facts as alleged in the petition state a cause 
of action the proceeding should not have been dismissed. 
Plaintiff Parker brings the action individually and as 
secretary of the Council of Federated Municipal Crafts of 
I,os Angeles, an unincorporated union, referred to as union, 
having as its members various other unincorporated unions, 
called affiliated unions. II e alleges that he brings the action 
on behalf of himself 1:nclividually and on behalf of the affiliated 
unions and the members thereof; that the union is devoted to 
the improvement of working conditions and wages of the mem-
bers of the affiliated unions and they have authoTizecl the union 
to represent them in achievmg those ends; that members of 
those unions work for the city. 
It thus clearly appears that plaintiff is acting, in effect, 
as the authorized agent or representative of the members of 
the affiliated unions, some of whom are city employees, inas-
much as he is an officer and representative of the union which in 
turn represents the members of the affiliated unions. It cannot 
be doubted that the members of the affiliated unions, who are 
employed by the city, are definitely beneficially interested in 
having their wages and salaries meet those paid in private 
employment as required by section 425 of the charter, supra. 
The action was properly instituted by Parker as a mem-
ber of the unions and their members. The union as such 
operating in Los Angeles has a substantial interest in the 
wages paid to all in the class of craftsmen, of which the mem-
berships of the affiliated unions consist, whether they are 
members of the latter or not; siinilarly each member of the 
union has an interest in that matter. They have an interest 
in what the city pays such craftsmen, because what one em-
ployer pays his employees has an impact on what another pays 
or will pay. The phrase "beneficially interested" person who 
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may apply for a writ of mandate (Code Civ. Proc., § 1086) 
is given liberal construction. 
Moreover, a proceeding is maintainable by Parker as an 
officer and member of the union and agent and representative 
of the members of the affiliated unions, including members 
who work for the city. The . interest of such members is 
common. He would be beneficially interested because those 
on behalf of whom the proceeding was maintained would have 
the interest. This is necessary because of the impracticability 
of all the members joining and the inability of the unincor-
porated unions to prosecute the proceeding as an associa-
tion. It is said: "Where there is no statutory authorization 
of suits by or against an unincorporated association in the 
association name, the remedy, when a cause of action for 
or against an association exists, is by an action in the names 
of the several persons constituting the association, or in the 
name of a trustee or trustees in whom some right of property 
is vested or who is specially mdhorized to sue. . . . The doc-
trine of virtual representation, which recognizes the right of 
a few persons to sue or defend on behalf of themselves and 
all others similarly situated, has frequently been applied in 
the case of actions by or against voluntary unincorporated 
associations; and it is well settled that where the members 
of such an association are too numerous to be joined in the 
action, or where the society is composed of very many mem-
bers, one or more of the members may sue on behalf of all 
the interested parties. . . . Under this general rule, a suit 
may be brought by the officers of the association or a com-
mittee appointed or authorized to prosecute it." ( 4 Am.J ur ., 
Associations and Clubs, §§ 48, 49.) Our law provides that 
''when the question is one of common or general interest, 
of many persons, or when the parties are numerous, and it 
is impracticable to bring them all before the court, one or 
more may sue or defend for the benefit of all." (Code Civ. 
Proc., § 382.) That provision applies to actions at law as 
well as equity ( W eave1· v. Pasadena Tottrnament of Roses 
Assn., 32 Cal.2d 833, 837 [198 P.2d 514] ), and in regard to 
proceedings such as mandamus ''except as otherwise provided 
in this title (under which mandamus falls), the provisions of 
part two of this code (the part in which section 382 appears) 
are applicable to and constitute the rules of practice in the pro-
ceedings mentioned in this title." (Code Civ. Proc., § 1109.) 
In Funeral Directors Assn. v. Board of Funeral Directors 
&; Embalmers, 67 Cal.App.2d 311 [154 P.2d 39], it was held 
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that a nonprofit corporation of funeral directors composed 
of persons in that business had not sufficient interest to annul 
by mandamus an order of the State Board of Funeral Direc-
tors granting probation to a licensee whose license it had re-
voked. In Associated Boat Industries v. Marshall, 104 Cal. 
App.2d 21 [230 P.2d 379], it was held that a nonprofit cor-
poration whose members consisted of those in certain indus-
tries who were affected by an administrative regulation had 
not sufficient interest to attack it in an action for declara-
tory relief under Government Code, section 11440, author-
izing such action by any interested persons. Assuming the 
correctness of those decisions they did not involve a public 
duty of general public importance, such as section 425 of the 
charter, supra, nor were the associations unincorporated and 
thus without right to sue. 
It is defendants' position that a court will not intervene 
in this dispute because an ordinance fixing the salaries and 
wages is legislative and its determination that the salaries 
fixed are in accord with prevailing rates cannot be questioned 
except for fraud or corruption; that section 425 of the char-
ter, supra, is directory only. 
In City & County of San Francisco v. Boyd, 22 Cal.2d 685 
[140 P.2d 666], this court considered the charter of the City 
and County of San Prancisco which placed the duty to fix 
salaries and wages on the board of supervisors. It was the 
duty of the civil service commission to make an investiga-
tion and prepare a schedule of rates to be submitted to the 
board and (p. 688) : ''The compensations fixed as herein pro-
vided shall be in accord with the generally prevailing rates 
of wages for like service and working conditions in private 
employment or in other comparable governmental organiza-
tions in this state." The salaries and wages fixed there-
under were attacked as being in excess of the prevailing rate 
elsewhere. It was held that (p. 690): "The determination 
whether proposed rates of compensation are in accord or in 
harmony with generally prevailing rates is within the dis-
eretion of the rate-making authority. The courts will not 
interfere with that determination unless the action is fraudu-
lent or so palpably unrrasonable and arbitrary as to indi-
cate an abuse of discretion as a matter of law," and (p. 692) 
''an ordinance is invalid if the mandatory prerequisites to 
its enactment are not substantially observed." Also, it is 
implicit in that decision that the charter provision imposed 
a mandatory duty on the board to adopt a prevailing com-
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pensation rate and it has been so interpreted (Adams v. City 
& County of San Francisco, 94 Cal.App.2d 586 [211 P.2d 368, 
212 P.2d 272] ; see Adams v. Wolff, 84 Cal.App.2d 435 [190 
P.2d 665]). Section 425 here involved is substantially the 
same as the court considered in City & County of San Fran-
cisco v. Boyd, supra, 22 Cal.2d 685, hence it is not necessary 
to rely upon Adams v. Wolff, supra, 84 Cal.App.2d 435, where 
the court dealt with an amended version of the San Fran-
cisco charter provision. It is clear, therefore, that section 
425 is mandatory. 
Defendants contend the standard fixed by section 425 is 
general and vague, leaving complete and unbridled discretion 
in the council. It is true that such phrases as ''quality of 
service'' and ''similar employment'' are general and flexible 
leaving much for determination by the council but a ''rea-
sonable or just'' correspondence between the rates paid by 
private industry and the city is to be ascertained. I do not 
take the same "quality" of service to mean of the same com-
petence or perfection. While that is one of the definitions 
of "quality," it also means of the same class or nature of 
service, such as a carpenter. (Webster's Int. Diet., 2d ed., 
p. 2031.) The prevailing rate may be ascertained and it 
is done in many cities. 
The question is, therefore, whether the city's action was 
''fraudulent or so palpably unreasonable and arbitrary as to 
indicate an abuse of discretion." (City & County of San 
Francisco v. Boyd, st~pra, 22 Cal.2d 685, 690.) I believe the 
petition is sufficient on that point without reaching the question 
of whether there was an abuse of discretion in fixing the 
amount of the compensation as compared to that paid in 
private industry. It will be recalled that it is alleged in the 
petiti(m, qnoteel supra, that although defendants had the 
<'lata of wage rates in private industry and also government 
11nits, they refused to give any consideration to it in passing 
the ordinance. They refused to consider the most cogent 
eYic1enee ayailable, condnct which would constitute a denial of 
clue process in a judicial proceeding. Certainly such refusal 
was arbitrary under the test stated in the Boyd case, supra. 
Furthermore, the compensation fixed may be so completely 
ont of line with that prevailing in private industry that the 
action of the council would be arbitrary and palpably un-
reasonable under the test stated in City & County of San Fran-
cisco v. Boyd, supra, 22 Cal.2d 685. A provision such as 
section 425 of the charter is, in the language of Justice Car-
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dozo used when he Wll$ Chief ,Tustice of the New York Court 
of Appeals, " ... an attempt by the state (the people of 
the city here) to hold its territorial subdivisions to a standard 
of social justice in their dealings with laborers, workmen, and 
mechanics. It is to be interpreted with the degree of liberality 
essential to the attainment of the end in view." (Austin v. 
City of New York, 258 N.Y. 113 [179 N.E. 313, 314).) The 
charter of a city within its proper field is the city's con-
stitution (Adams v. Wolff, supra, 84 Cal.App.2d 435) and 
the council, the legislative body, must comply with it. It is 
generally true that the courts will not interfere with a legis-
lative process or determination (see Johnston v. Board of 
Supervisors, 31 Cal.2d 66 [187 P.2d 686); Santa Clara County 
v. Superior Court, 33 Cal.2d 552 [203 P.2d 1]) yet: '"l'he 
character of the action of the city council, called generally the 
legislative body, in a particular case depends on the nature of 
the act or duty and the provisions of the statute under which it 
is performed. Here the statute makes the distinction between 
non-legislative and legislative action by directing exercise of 
the latter function only when the protests are shown to be 
insufficient. 
''This court in other cases has recognized the division be-
tween the administrative or other nonlegislative function pre-
ceding the performance of the legislative act where constitu-
tional or statutory requirements were involved. (McFadden 
v. Jordan, 32 Cal.2d 330 [196 P.2d 787]; Gage v. Jordan, 
23 Cal.2d 794 [147 P.2d 387); Epperson v. Jordan, 12 Cal.2d 
61, 64 [82 P.2d 445] and cases cited.)" (American Distl. 
Co. v. City Cowncil, Sattsalito, 34 Cal.2d 660, 665 [213 P.2d 
704, 18 A.L.R.2d 124 7].) In the Sausalito case the precedent 
fact to be found by the council was whether protests to 
annexation by a city of additional territory were filed by the 
owners of more than 50 per cent of the property in the 
territory. If there were sufficient protests the territory could 
not be annexed; if insufficient an ordinance of annexation 
could be considered by the council. Here the city's constitu-
tion (charter) expressly imposes upon the council the duty 
of ascertaining the rates of compensation in private industry, 
a specific factual matter. A specific test with which the 
ordinance must comply is established. If perchance the 
prevailing rate in private industry cannot be determined 
which is very doubtful, then it is excused from the requirement 
by the last phrase in section 425. While it does not expressly 
provide that it shall first make a finding on that question 
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(and perhaps hold hearings in aid thereof) before it passes 
an ordinance fixing its employees' compensation, the clear 
implication is that such a determination must be made either 
before or at the time of the adoption of the salary ordinance. 
Indeed the charter provides that the council and other author-
ity authorized to fix salaries shall appoint a representative 
to the salary standardization committee (the director of the 
budget is also a member) which grades and regrades the 
salaries of all classes of employees so that like salaries shall 
be paid for like duties and makes its recommendation to the 
council. (L.A. Charter, § 123.) 
The facts alleged are sufficient to state a case. It is charged 
that the council failed and refused to consider the surveys 
made by it; that according to the surveys and the city's rate 
of compensation the following appears: plumbers: survey 
$435 per month, city pay $303 to $375 graduated according 
to the years of service up to five years with the city; car-
penters: survey $369 (now $382) per month, city pay $259 
to $319 similarly graduated; laborers: survey, $273.18 (now 
$287.10) per month, city pay $181 to $221, similarly gradu-
ated. \Vhether there are factors which would defeat plaintiff's 
claim of similarity of work and pay in private industry or 
his other allegations is a matter that should be determined 
on a trial. 
The survey above mentioned was made jointly by the city, 
Los Angeles County, school district and housing authority. 
Plaintiff obtained a subpoena duces tecum ordering Howard 
E. Earl to produce at the taking of his deposition the survey 
and data upon which it was based. Earl's move to quash the 
subpoena was granted as to the deposition but as to trial he 
was required to attend and bring the papers except those 
parts showing the names and identities of the persons from 
whom the data was obtained. Apparently, Earl is the as-
sistant chief administrative officer of Los Angeles County 
and had charge of making the survey. Plaintiff moved for a 
reconsideration and an order permitting him to inspect and 
copy the survey. This was denied. Plaintiff complains, 
on this appeal from the judgment, of those denial orders as 
being erroneous. Defendants reply that those orders were 
intermediate and do not affect the judgment or plaintiff's 
rights and are thus not reversible on appeal from the judg-
ment; further, that as plaintiff took no exception to them 
he has waived any objection to them. 
It should be observed that the ground for quashing the 
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subpoena for the deposition and in part for the trial was 
because of the claimed confidential character of the names and 
identity of the employers from whom the data was obtained, 
a question considered by this court in City & County of San 
Francisco v. Superior Cottrt, 38 Cal.2d 156 [238 P.2d 581]. 
It was there held that the right to inspect public records 
(Gov. Code, § 1227; Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1888, 1892), did not 
extend to confidential records under Code of Civil Procedure, 
section 1881 ( 5), and that the names and identity of the em-
ployers furnishing data to the official for ascertaining the 
prevailing wage rate could and should be withheld. The case 
refrained from deciding what effect, if any, the withholding 
of such information would have upon proceedings in mandate 
attacking the rate of compensation fixed by the city. On 
that basis alone a portion of the orders of denial could be 
found valid. Thus the motion for an order to inspect and 
copy the survey should have been denied insofar as the in-
sprction extended to the names and identities of the employers 
giving information and the information given by particular 
employers, but the right to inspect the survey insofar as it 
related to the method used, the qualifications of the persons 
making it, all of which were requested by the motion, is clear. 
Under section 1000 of the Code of Civil Procedure an 
order may be obtained on motion to inspect and copy any 
paper containing material evidence and in the possession or 
control of the other party. No appeal lies from an order 
granting or denying a motion under section 1000 for it is 
not a nnal order or judgment in a collateral matter and is 
not listed as an appealable order in section 963 of the Code of 
Civil Procedure. (See Collins v. Corse, 8 Cal.2d 123 [64 P.2d 
137} ; Union Oil Co. v. Reconstruction Oil Co., 4 Cal.2d 541 
[51 P.2d 81]; Franchise 'Tax Board v. Superior Court, 36 Cal. 
2d 538 [225 P.2d 905}; Estate of Brady, 32 Cal.2d 478 (196 P. 
2d 881].) While mandamus will lie to attack the order (Austin 
v. 'l'1trrentine, 30 Cal.App.2d 750 [87 P.2d 72, 88 P.2d 178]) 
such order may be reviewed on appeal from the judgment 
because it "substantially affects the right of a party." (Code 
Civ. Proc., § 956.) The granting or denial of a motion to 
quash a subpoena is not appealable and may be attacked by 
mandamus ( Wemyss v. Superior Court, 38 Cal.2d 616 [241 
P.2d 525]), and is reviewable on appeal from the judgment. 
(Code Civ. Proc., § 956; Brou·n v. Snperim· Court, 34 Cal.2d 
559, 562 [212 P.2d 878}; see McClatchy Newspapers v. Su-
perior Court, 26 Ca12d 386 [159 P.2d 944].) 
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I refer to the orders of denial of the right to inspect in 
part and quashing of the subpoena in part as affecting the 
substantial rights of a party. Clearly they do, because one 
of the very questions at issue is whether the council acted 
arbitrarily, and necessarily involved therein were the surveys 
made and the method of making them. Hence, insofar as 
plaintiff was deprived of his right to take the deposition and 
inspect the surveys, accepting the names and identity of the 
employers furnishing data and the rate of compensation of 
particular employees, the trial court was in error. It is not 
necessary to decide whether it was necessary for plaintiff 
to take exception to the orders because the judgment should 
be reversed on the grounds heretofore mentioned. 
[L. A. No. 21347. In Bank. Mar. 10, 1953.] 
SEVEN UP BOTTI.JING COMPANY OF LOS ANGELES 
INCORPORA'I'ED, Appellant, v. GROCERY DRIVERS 
UNION LOCAI1 848 (an Unincorporated Association) 
et al., Respondents. 
[1] Appeal-Scope and Extent of Review-Pleadings.-Where pro-
ceedings on a preliminary injunction are separate from those 
leading to a judgment of dismissal on ground that complaint 
does not state a cause of action, and an appeal is taken only 
from such judgment, the court on appeal will not consider 
affidavits presented in connection with such injunction but 
will consider only the complaint, 
[2] Labor-Jurisdictional Strike Law-Activities Prohibited.-Al-
leged activities of defendant labor organizations consisting 
of concerted interference with plaintiff-employer's business 
arising out of a controversy between defendants and another 
labor organization, which had entered into a collective bar-
gaining agreement with plaintiff, as to which of these organ-
izations should have exclusive right to bargain collectively 
with plaintiff, fall within terms of Jurisdictional Strike Act. 
(Lab. Code, §§ 1115-1120.) 
[3] Id.-Pleading.-In employer's complaint against labor organ-
izations for violation of Jurisdictional Strike Act, an infer-
ence that the cause of defendants' concerted activities or 
picketing was a dispute between them and another labor or-
McK. Dig. References: [1] Appeal and Error, § 966; [2, 7, 9] 
Labor, §21; [3] Labor, §27; [4,6] Labor, ~23; [5] Labor, §25; 
[8] Labor, § 20a. 
